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 It is still too early to assess the full impact of the Internet on China’s rapidly 
evolving religious landscape. The effectiveness of Falun Gong’s cyber-militancy has, 
however, underscored the role new information technologies are playing in the shifting 
relations of power between a classic repressive state apparatus and deterritorialized 
religious or sectarian movements. While the impact of the development of the Internet 
and other information technologies on the economy and politics of the Chinese world 
has been amply commented upon, to my knowledge no in-depth research has yet been 
conducted on how the Internet is changing the form of religion in China. And yet, 
religious changes represent an important dimension of the cultural recomposition and 
transformation of the Chinese-speaking world. This chapter proposes some initial 
hypotheses and observations on these issues, a preliminary report on what will, I hope, 
become a full-fledged study on the expansion of religion in Chinese cyberspace and its 
impact on religious practices, communities, and state-religion relations in contemporary 
China. I will begin with some general considerations on the relationship between 
information technology and religion; briefly present the types of religious information 
available on the Chinese Internet; and consider the cases of Daoism and of Falun Gong. 
In these case studies, we will see how, as a “virtual panopticon” closely monitored by the 
state while at the same time a space allowing unprecedented freedom of expression and 
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access to information, the Internet is becoming a new zone of tension in the age-old 
agonistic relationship between religion and state in China.  
   I began this study with three hypotheses. It was assumed that new information 
technologies would have three effects on the Chinese religious landscape: (1) the 
emergence of a new space for religious expression, characterized by an autonomous 
quest for meaning rather than collective rituals; (2) a further undermining of orthodoxies 
accompanied by the emergence of new centers of religious influence; (3) greater 
integration of Chinese communities on the mainland and overseas, as well as between 
Chinese and non-Chinese communities. So far, while the data seems to support the first 
two hypotheses, the third needs to be reformulated: a clear difference appears between 
online religion in mainland China and Hong Kong-Taiwan, with, surprisingly, the 
potentialities of the Web being more fully exploited on the mainland than in Hong Kong 
and Taiwan. This discrepancy will be described and explained in our case study of 
Daoism.   
 
General considerations 
 
Religion can be considered as the transmission of a specific type of memory or 
information. On this basis, the invention of new information technologies has had a 
profound impact on the transformations of religion throughout history, and can shed 
light on current trends of religious modernity, notably the globalization of religion on the 
one hand, and the increasing autonomy of the religious subject on the other. One way to 
see religion is as a system for creating, maintaining, developing and controlling the 
individual or collective consciousness of belonging to a specific line of belief2, by linking 
individuals to a body of memory. As such, one of the overriding concerns of religion is 
the perpetuation and diffusion of this body of memory. The social forms of religion will 
to a large extent reflect the technical means by which religious teachings and practices are 
transmitted. For instance, the role of religious specialists, whose duty is to hold, protect 
and transmit sacred traditions, will be different in entirely oral cultures, in societies in 
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which there exists a small class or scribes, and in literate civilizations in which all people 
have access to religious scriptures. The impact of the printing press on the emergence of 
Protestantism is well known: the mass production of the Bible and its distribution 
outside of clerical circles to lay believers, helped to popularize the notion of the 
individual’s direct and unmediated relation to God. The gradual trend, throughout 
history, of the “modernization” of religiosity expressed by the increasing autonomy of 
the individual in religious experience and belief, can be linked to the evolution of 
information technologies from orality to writing, printing, electronic media, and now the 
Internet. Each of these advances have permitted the dissemination of religious 
information on an increasingly global scale, at an increasingly rapid pace, to an ever larger 
number of people, with an ever increasing diversity of content. Seen from a broad 
perspective, the evolution of religion in modern times has seen a tendency toward 
globalization on the one hand, and individualization on the other. In this context, 
spiritually “free” individuals, whose religious identity is no longer merely inherited, can 
create new communities of choice out of a limitless, worldwide range of religious 
possibilities. More specifically, the Internet challenges the traditional grounding of 
religion in  bodies, territories, and institutions. For oral cultures, the primary means for 
the reproduction and transmission of religious memory has been through the disposition 
of bodies and objects in ritual performance. Scriptures reduced but did not eliminate the 
importance of ritual in literate cultures, often becoming central to the ritual manipulation 
of sacred books. Digital culture, however, dematerializes religious texts. The gestures of 
manipulation are the same, making no distinctions between the Word of God, gossip, or 
smut, all transmitted through the same wires and flashed onto the same screen. Polarities 
in space and time between the sacred and the profane are corroded; the ritual 
coordination and movement of bodies gives way to the solitary clicking of electronic 
mice. The physical congregation of worshipers in a single spot – the temple, church or 
sacred ground, often with its own territory marking the limits of a community – can be 
replaced by online networks of individuals with common affinities, seeking the same 
information and communicating directly with each other. The foundations of religious 
(and, in the Chinese case, political) institutions – bureaucratized channels for the 
generation, processing, and control of religious information – are eroded in a virtual 
marketplace where nothing is easier than mixing and matching the itinerary of one’s own 
spiritual journey. Disembodiment, deterritorialization and disinstitutionalization are 
processes which could be triggered or accelerated by the Internet in relation to religion3.   
 Such are some of the ways in which we can assume that the form of cyberspace will 
modify the flows of spiritual information. But the “on-line world” does not eliminate and 
replace off-line reality; rather, the interpenetration of the two is what is creating new 
religious formations4. A rapid overview of the pre-digital configuration of Chinese 
religion will allow us to better understand the results of this interpenetration in the 
Chinese case.  
   
The Chinese case 
 
 New information technologies can be said to be accelerating the “institutional 
deregulation of belief”5 which is a global characteristic of modernity, a phenomenon 
which has affected the Chinese religious landscape as much as in the West, albeit as a 
result of a different historical process. Since the Song dynasty (960-1279), by attempting 
to control and limit the expansion of the institutionalized religions (Buddhism and 
Taoism), the state has contributed to the gradual weakening of « orthodox » religions, 
creating the conditions for the flourishing of popular religion and sectarianism6. The only 
centralized institution comparable to the “Church” as we know it in the West was the 
Imperial state itself, with its Son of Heaven embodied by the Emperor, its ritual system of 
governance, and its “clergy” of Confucian administrators trained in the art of virtues. 
Locally, religious life centred around the temple, which was the focus of all community 
life. Temples and their festivals structured the space and time of families, lineages, 
villages, guilds, and the state. Temples were usually autonomous organizations governed 
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by local associations which hired clergy to conduct rituals7. However, the role of temples 
in Chinese community life has steadily declined since the beginning of the 20th century, 
particularly in the cities. During this period, waves of war and modernizing revolutions 
have largely eliminated the concrete and visible forms of religious life centred around 
neighbourhood temples and festivals in the cities. The destruction of family and local 
cults, through which Chinese peoples’ religious identity was expressed8, has created 
atomized bodies, « modern » individuals cut off from their ancestral filiations. The 
weakening and destruction of traditional religious institutions has accelerated the 
emergence of a modern religiosity characterized by individual, voluntary engagement. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, body cultivation practices known as qigong, owing to the simplicity 
of their transmission and their indeterminate status between health practice and religion, 
were one of the few forms of religious transmission and practice to survive in urban 
areas. After the Cultural Revolution, while the spread of other forms of religious practice 
and community was still difficult, qigong could rapidly propagate and integrate itself into 
the urban fabric of society. Parks, sidewals and public spaces had become, through qigong, 
alternative spaces for the expression of a modern religiosity. But since the late 1990s, the 
militancy of Falungong, with its roots in the qigong movement, and the repression it has 
provoked, have led to most qigong groups dissolving or going underground9.  
 It is in this context that cyberspace has emerged as a new frontier for the 
dissemination of religious ideas and for the expression of the spiritual search.  
Our historical overview shows that prior to the advent of the Internet, the traditional 
religious ordering of bodies through ritual had already largely disappeared in the cities. 
The meditation and gymnastic traditions of qigong, however, could adapt to an industrial 
organization of homogenized individuals gathering daily for mass exercise sessions. As 
we will discuss further, Falun Gong was able to connect this movement to digital 
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communication technologies, facilitating the spontaneous organization of large public 
demonstrations. Many religious and spiritual groups and seekers, however, at a time 
when temple-centred religiosity has become a pale shadow of what it used to be, and 
when qigong-style group practice in parks has been banned or discouraged, now lack a 
formal, fixed location in physical space. It is in this context that the Internet has opened 
a new virtual space for the development of religion.  
 
Portals to religion 
  
A foray into the world of online religion can begin with one of the main Chinese 
language web portals, such as Chinese Yahoo.com and sohu.com. These provide links to 
religious sites summarized in Tables 1 and 2. The first thing we notice from these tables 
is how a “denominational” classification of religion has imposed itself on the internet 
portals – even though the Chinese-designed portal, sohu, mixes denominational categories 
with others: organizations, institutes, religious problems, news, etc. Superficially, the 
portals may be reinforcing the “denominationalization” of Chinese religion, a process 
which has been going on since the 20th century and especially since the founding of the 
Peoples’ Republic, which, importing Western theories of religion, undertook to identify 
Chinese religious “believers” and classify them according to institutional affiliations. 
Indeed, prior to the 20th century, although the “Three Doctrines” of Confucianism, 
Daoism and Buddhism, each which its own clergy and scripture, had an independent 
existence, most local temples and religious communities were not explicitly associated 
with one or the other of the main traditions. Whether internet users remain loyal to one 
“religion” or freely surf from one tradition to the other is a question that merits further 
investigation. A second, evident observation is the overwhelming predominance of 
Christianity and Buddhism. Compared to the indigenous tradition of Daoism, which has 
always been closely tied to the liturgical structures of local communities, Christianity and 
Buddhism were already, prior to the Internet, globalized religions, less embedded in local 
territories and ritual, with a greater focus on textual doctrine, and a strong commitment 
to the universal propagation of sacred text: orientations that could more easily translate 
into the colonization of cyberspace. Within Christianity, the weak presence of 
Catholicism is also striking compared with Protestantism: the horizontal, fragmented 
configuration of Protestant communities seems to have penetrated the Internet faster 
than the monolithic, hierarchical institutions of the Catholic Church.  
 
Category Total number of sites   Number of sites listed as related 
to mainland China  
Protestantism 607 140 
Buddhism 352 109 
Catholicism 38 8 
Divination 34 7 
Islam 33 12 
Daoism 23 13 
New Age  10 1 
Yiguandao 8 -- 
Popular Religion10 4 -- 
 Table 1. Religious sites listed in cn.yahoo.com11 
 
Category Total number of sites   
Buddhism 1186 
Christianity 1049 
Islam 75 
Daoism 69 
Judaism 25 
News & Media 24 
Other Religions  18 
Religious Organizations 12 
Religious Institutes & Schools 10 
Resources for Research 8 
Religion and the Times 8 
Religious Problems 8 
Chan 6 
Baha’i 3 
Hinduism 3 
Table 2. Religious sites listed in sohu.com12 
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It should be noted that sites classified under “religion” represent only part of the online 
world devoted to the spiritual and religious search. Sohu, for instance, lists a further 1263 
sites under “mysterious culture” – mostly devoted to various forms of divination and 
ghost stories; 492 sites under “myth and folklore”, which include sites on popular cults 
such as Mazu, BBS forums on the Book of Changes, etc. Under “sports and recreation”, 
one finds 77 sites devoted to qigong and 714 to martial arts.  
 
Online Daoism 
  
 A deeper exploration of the ocean of online data can begin with a look into the sites 
listed under “Daoism”. Choosing the most “Chinese” of the religions allows us to see 
what is happening online in the tradition that we would assume to be the least influenced 
by international networks. Getting a comprehensive picture is also facilitated by the small 
number of sites in this category.  
 A survey of 29 Chinese-language websites listed under “Daoism” in the portals in 
March 2003 found 14 sites based in mainland China, eight in Taiwan, six in Hong Kong 
and one in Germany. A significant difference can be seen between the mainland and 
Hong Kong/ Taiwan sites: the latter are all run by temples or by established 
organizations, while most of the mainland sites are maintained by individuals or 
businesses. Almost all of the Hong Kong and Taiwan sites publicize temple or 
organization activities, while only two of the mainland sites (also maintained by temples) 
do so. The mainland sites are more likely to contain general information on Daoism, 
offer scriptures for download, provide online forums or chat services, and post opinions 
and editorials. The Taiwanese sites are more likely to offer specific information, notably 
on temple divinities. Few of the Hong Kong sites contain opinion pieces or content 
pertaining to temple divinities. Overall, the Hong Kong and Taiwanese sites can be said 
to be an extension into cyberspace of the traditional temple-based configuration of 
Chinese religion. The mainland sites, however, reflect a more eclectic mix, where one 
finds sites created by individuals impassioned by Daoism (see http://a863.xiloo.com) 
and others who claim to be masters (see www.jingxiantianshi.com), and by various types 
of groups promoting Chinese culture. Overall, the mainland sites reflect a more 
individual, idiosyncratic and interactive exploration of China’s spiritual traditions, and a 
greater degree of commercialization (providing fortune-telling or feng-shui services).  
 The Internet thus reveals a more “modern” religiosity in Communist China, 
detached from organized institutions, more centred on the individual, and in which the 
separation between online and offline realities is greater than for the more traditional 
configuration of religion in Taiwan and Hong Kong. It would appear that in the 
mainland, Communist control has not prevented a greater degree of individual initiative 
and entrepreneurship from emerging than in the temple-dominated religious landscape 
of Taiwan and Hong Kong. On the mainland, the Internet is reinforcing what was 
previously a minority trend in Chinese religion, in which individual study of religious 
writings and content becomes more important than participation in temple rituals. While 
there has always been a current of “lettered”, more mystical and individualistic religion 
pursued by Chinese literati and scholars, traditionally, ritual practice has been more 
important than doctrine in Chinese religion. Religious surfing on the internet, however, 
changes the emphasis from practice to content.  
  
The Political and Geographic Dynamics of a Daoist Website 
 
An interesting case in point is the Taoist Culture & Information Centre 
(www.taoism.org.hk), one of the largest web-sites on Daoism, produced by a Hong Kong 
Taoist temple, the Feng Ying Seen Koon13. This project began in 1998, after some 
members of the Hong Kong Daoist community noticed the lack of information on 
Daoism on the internet in comparison with Buddhism and Christianity. The temple then 
decided to sponsor a major Chinese-English online database as a contribution to the 
propagation of the religion. Several challenges were encountered in the course of this 
project. The first was how to produce large quantities of text on Daoism that would be 
accessible to lay readers. In the absence of practicing Daoists able to write at length on 
the history, major figures, and major concepts of the religion, the temple had to hire 
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academic scholars from mainland universities, including Qing Xitai, Li Gang and Jiang 
Sheng, whose contributions were often based on Marxist and materialist theory. At the 
end of the first phase of the project in 2002, over 400 articles had been posted in three 
versions: traditional Chinese, simplified Chinese and English. By all accounts, the project 
was very successful: by June 2002, the traditional Chinese version of the site was 
registering approx. 1.1 million hits per month, the simplified had over 400,000 hits with a 
monthly increase of approx. 25000 visits since the beginning of the year; and the English 
version was visited by over 320,000 surfers14.   
 In its discussions on the kind of additional content that should be added to the 
website, the database commission, composed of prominent members of the Hong Kong 
Daoist community and academic scholars of Daoism from the mainland and Hong 
Kong, was then confronted with a new problem: it was noted that while Christian and 
Buddhist web-sites contain simple and precise explanations of their respective religions’ 
doctrines and positions on current social problems, this aspect was weak in the case of 
the Daoist web-site. After much discussion, it was decided to write up the “Daoist 
position” on current events and social issues such as terrorism and the environment. But 
this decision was not made without debate, some commission members raising the issue 
of the absence of any commonly recognized authority to come up with these positions. 
Gradually, however, the website has come to acquire an authority of its own, to such 
degree that the London Museum once addressed a request to the database commission 
to resolve an enigmatic interpretation of a Chinese Daoist painting in the museum.  
 The success of the Feng Ying Seen Koon’s Taoist Culture & Information Centre 
was not without creating some jealousies among other Daoist temples in Hong Kong, 
some of which are reported to be considering developing their own large-scale websites. 
Through its website, the Feng Ying Seen Koon, which was previously a relatively minor 
local temple in Hong Kong, has suddenly risen to global prominence in Daoist circles 
and now exercises a global influence in the dissemination and interpretation of 
information on Taoism.  
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 The case of the Taoist Culture & Information Centre thus illustrates two trends 
which are accelerated by the introduction of the Internet into religious life: the first is a 
shift in emphasis from a local community, ritual-based practise of religion to an 
individualistic approach characterized by the search for more information content. The 
second is a shift in the relative influence of different religious organizations: those with a 
strong presence in cyberspace can acquire new influence extending much farther than 
their original local sphere of activities.  
 Such a redistribution of influence among religious organizations can further 
undermine institutionalized religion, which has always been relatively weak in China. 
Informal and non-orthodox organizations can be as easily accessible online as 
state-supported institutions. However, though state control on religion is indeed 
weakened by the Internet, it can continue to assert itself in manners both direct and 
subtle. If blocking access to websites is an instance of direct intervention, state influence 
continues to be exercised in a more subtle fashion toward those sites that are accessible. 
The Taoist Culture & Information Centre, for instance, is very careful to present content 
that is acceptable in the context of current Chinese ideology and political tendencies.  
 The TCIC is based outside of mainland China, but directed at mainlanders, a 
strategy that seems to be tolerated by the Chinese authorities. Such a site acts as a hub 
for the building of religious networks and common discourse throughout the Chinese 
world and beyond. While the majority of visits are to the traditional Chinese version 
(likely coming from Hong Kong and Taiwan), sizeable minorities are from mainland 
China (readers of the simplified Chinese version) and from other countries (English 
version). The content of all three versions is identical. Since the authors of the articles are 
for the most part academic scholars from the mainland, and since the database 
commission makes a conscious effort to avoid content which would be politically 
sensitive on the mainland, we can see how, indirectly, Chinese state policy and ideology 
on religion exercises itself not only on sites based in the mainland, but also on a site 
based in Hong Kong which has become an important provider of online information on 
Taoism for the whole Chinese world. Interpenetration and mutual influence characterize 
this strategy, where an outside organization can penetrate into Chinese cyberspace, but, 
at the same time and indirectly, Chinese state influence on religious discourse spreads 
beyond Chinese borders.  
 
The Online Militancy of Falun Gong 
 
 An alternative strategy is one of direct confrontation, the best-known example of 
which is Falun Gong. New information technologies had become central to the 
organization’s functioning by 1997-98, when its founder, Li Hongzhi, settled in the 
United States and created an international communication system allowing him to lead, 
from a distance, his millions of followers in China. Beginning in the 1980’s, the qigong 
movement – of which Falun Gong was one school -- had developed an organizational 
model based on the systematic tramsmission of exercise routines from a central 
association down to thousands of local parcs and practice sites around China and the 
world. This setup, based on loose networks of volunteer trainers and requiring almost no 
property or resources, allowed for the rapid creation of mass organizations by hundreds 
of qigong masters. Li Hongzhi was the first of these to make full use of the Internet, 
allowing him and his key disciples to send directives from anywhere in the world, 
spreading through electronic means and then word of mouth (not only email but also 
telephone and fax – the internet had not yet become a mass phenomenon in 1999) to 
millions of disciples. Qigong transmission networks, which until then had been devoted to 
the propagation of simple, repetitive exercise routines, could now instantly activate 
millions of people to trigger spectacular events, without needing a rigidly structured 
organization. Through the informal circulation of news and directives between 
practitioners, “spontaneous” but perfectly-organized mass demonstrations were held in 
dozens of localities around China between 1997 and 1999, usually to protest government 
or media organs critical of Falun Gong, sometimes attracting over 10,000 practitioners. It 
was such a protest, surrounding the Party leadership’s compound at Zhongnanhai on 
April 24, 1999, with the heavy symbolism which it evoked, that triggered the Chinese 
state’s ruthless anti-Falun Gong campaign.  
 Against Falun Gong, the state deployed the classic repressive apparatus: mobilizing 
the Party and government-controlled mass organizations; lauching a propaganda 
campaign through all media; punishing leaders and hard-core practitioners with torture 
and internment in prisons, psychiatric hospitals and work camps. But the enemy was not 
a typical dissident organization. Its leader lives abroad; Falun Gong’s virtual organization 
can easily set up new nodes at points anywhere on Earth. No longer a strictly Chinese 
organization, it has rapidly adopted the best techniques of the American art of public 
relations and online militancy. An all-out propaganda war is being waged between Falun 
Gong and the Chinese state, and cyberspace has become one of the key battlefields.  
 The Chinese government’s position has largely been defensive: all Falun Gong 
websites have been blocked in China, and practitioners have been arrested for 
disseminating Falun Gong emails15. A dozen Anti-Falun Gong websites have been 
created by various government agencies. Some of them are available in English and can 
be accessed from Chinese embassy web-sites 16 . Interestingly, one mainland 
Chinese-language anti-Falun Gong website contains a point-by-point refutation of Falun 
Gong claims that the supposed self-immolation by practitioners on Tiananmen Square 
on Jan. 23, 2001, was a government-staged hoax – implicitly acknowledging that the 
Falun Gong version is widely known on the mainland17. Indeed, in spite of state attempts 
to block mass emailings, Falun Gong “spam” tracts do reach the electronic mailboxes of 
ordinary Chinese email users.   
Outside China, Falun Gong and its practitioners have established dozens of 
websites, most of which are based in the US and Canada, but also in Europe, Iran, 
Turkey, India, Israel, Brazil, etc. Most local sites carry information diffused by eight 
official Falun Gong sites18. One of these, www.falundafa.org, contains downloadable 
Falun Gong scriptures, instructions for practice, and contact information for practice 
sites; another, www.pureinsight.org, contains articles on scientific and cultural subjects 
related to Falun Gong. The other six sites are almost exclusively devoted to the campaign 
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www.pureawakening.net, www.pureinsight.org, www.fofg.org, www.flgjustice.org.  
 
to defend Falun Gong against Jiang Zemin and the Chinese government. An online TV 
station (fgmtv.net) provides videos of practice methods, testimonies, and news 
programmes in several languages. A twice-weekly e-newsletter and daily press releases 
disseminate the latest news on the repression in China, lawsuits launched against Jiang 
Zemin and other officials before courts in dozens of countries, expressions of support 
from legislators, etc. Falun Gong is continually publishing staggering amounts of 
information online. Dozens of human-rights reports can be downloaded. One example is 
a 91-page report which contains the names, photographs, and biographies of victims of 
psychiatric internment; the exact addresses and telephone numbers of the departments 
involved; the names, titles, and ages of the perpetrators; and detailed accounts of 
incidents of torture19. Elsewhere online, the names and contact details of scores of 
persons involved in the persecution in China, including minor officials, were posted, as 
targets of letter-writing, fax and telephone campaigns. Misfortunes which had occurred 
to these individuals, such as illnesses, accidents or death, were described as signs of 
karmic justice. How Falun Gong was able to obtain such detailed information in dozens 
of small Chinese localities was not clear. Even natural disasters and bad weather hitting 
various parts of China were reported as signs of dharmic retribution20. All manner of bad 
social and economic news on China were also given as proof of the moral depravity of 
the regime and the calamities it is bringing on the country. Overall, Falun Gong has been 
thoroughly systematic in its use of the Internet to propagate its message and to organize 
its campaigns. This has allowed for the growth of a loosely organized worldwide 
movement able to respond instantly to information, campaigns and spiritual guidance 
disseminated through both a centralized hierarchy of websites and through the horizontal 
spread of electronic communications between practitioners. Online access to the 
Master’s pronouncements makes it possible to eliminate intermediate formal structures 
of authority within the movement, even though Li Hongzhi’s public appearances – the 
only times his disciples can enter his physical presence – are rare and brief. Cyberspace 
becomes a medium through which the master’s charismatic power can be exercised by 
                                                        
19 Falun Gong Human Rights Working Group, “Falun Gong Practitioners Tortured in Mental Hospitals 
Throughout China”, downloaded in March 2003 from www.clearwisdom.net.    
20 www.minghui.cc/mh, accessed in November 2001.  
establishing a direct virtual connection between himself and each individual 
practitioner21.    
 
Concluding remarks       
     
  These pages have only touched on the surface of what is becoming an essential 
dimension of the Chinese religious landscape. In spite of the “panopticon effect” of a 
cyberspace through which the Chinese state can easily monitor its subjects, the Internet 
has allowed the emergence of new networks of seekers and providers, and for the 
exploration of forms of religiosity which are difficult to express in other public spaces in 
China. Ironically, then, state restrictions on offline religious activity may have given the 
Internet a greater role in the evolution of religious culture than in other countries. And if 
the militancy of Falun Gong has led the state to impose an almost complete blackout of 
non-governmental information on Falun Gong in China, a different dynamic is prevailing 
in the rest of the online religious world in mainland China: creation, exploration and 
ambiguity are daringly pursued under Big Brother’s nose.        
 Further inquiry on Chinese religion in cyberspace should include a systematic 
analysis of the content of religion on the Chinese internet, the differences between online 
and print content, and the relative dissemination of information originating from the 
mainland, from overseas chinese sources, and from non-Chinese sources, with particular 
attention to discussions in online forums. Is there a specific online religious discourse 
which is different from other forms of religious discourse? Key websites representative of 
various religious and spiritual traditions should be analysed in depth, detailed statistics on 
their users obtained, and their sponsors and authors interviewed. Links between websites 
should be mapped, in order to trace the existence of affinity networks which may (or may 
not) reveal the emergence of new currents. Online religious seekers should be contacted 
and interviewed, and typical profiles drawn up, so as to understand the sociological 
makeup of religious surfers. The relationship between using online information and other 
                                                        
21 For further analysis on Falun Gong and the Internet, see Mark R. Bell & Taylor Boas, “Falun Gong and the 
Internet: Evangelism, Community, and Struggle for Survival”, Nova Religio 6-2 (2003): 277-293.  
forms of religious practice and community should also be elucidated: is the internet a 
complement to other forms of religious practice and community? Does it direct seekers 
away from other forms or, on the contrary, is it a conduit that leads them to join religious 
communities? Does the internet have an impact on other forms of religious practice? 
Another area deserving of investigation is the link between religion and civil society as 
expressed in the internet. Are virtual religious networks on the internet self-contained in a 
closed circuit, or are they linked to other groups and other social concerns? Will the 
proliferation of religious content on the Internet lead to a relaxing of state policy towards 
religious and other popular groups, or will it, on the contrary, provoke even harsher 
measures of control?  
  
 
 
